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ABSTRACT
Recommender systems (RSs) have attained exceptional performance
in learning users’ preferences and helping them in finding the most
suitable products. Recent advances in adversarial machine learning
(AML) in the computer vision domain have raised interests in the
security of state-of-the-art model-based recommenders. Recently,
worrying deterioration of recommendation accuracy has been ac-
knowledged on several state-of-the-art model-based recommenders
(e.g., BPR-MF) when machine-learned adversarial perturbations
contaminate model parameters. However, while the single-step fast
gradient sign method (FGSM) is the most explored perturbation
strategy, multi-step (iterative) perturbation strategies, that demon-
strated higher efficacy in the computer vision domain, have been
highly under-researched in recommendation tasks.
In this work, inspired by the basic iterative method (BIM) and the
projected gradient descent (PGD) strategies proposed in the CV do-
main, we adapt the multi-step strategies for the item recommenda-
tion task to study the possible weaknesses of embedding-based rec-
ommendermodels underminimal adversarial perturbations. Letting
the magnitude of the perturbation be fixed, we illustrate the highest
efficacy of the multi-step perturbation compared to the single-step
one with extensive empirical evaluation on two widely adopted rec-
ommender datasets. Furthermore, we study the impact of structural
dataset characteristics, i.e., sparsity, density, and size, on the perfor-
mance degradation issued by presented perturbations to support
RS designer in interpreting recommendation performance variation
due to minimal variations of model parameters. Our implementa-
tion and datasets are available at https://anonymous.4open.science/
r/9f27f909-93d5-4016-b01c-8976b8c14bc5/.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) models play an essential role in the every-
day lives of people. Recommender systems (RSs) are involved in
many decision-making and mission-critical tasks; thus, the qual-
ity of learned models could directly impact people’s lives, society,
and businesses. The fundamental assumption underneath trained
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recommender models is that user-item historical interactions can
serve as the appropriate ground-truth to learn users’ preferences.
Consequently, machine-learned recommendation models, such as
latent-factor models (LFMs), try to learn what users might like by
using any available signal in the data that can minimize an empiri-
cal loss, point-wise, pair-wise, or even list-wise [2, 23, 31]. However,
users’ feedbacks are imperfect due to either biases [6] or misop-
erations. An adversarial perturbation mechanism may learn and
leverage imperfections and approximations made by the ML model
during the training phase to guide the recommendation outcomes
toward an engineered — and often illegitimate — purpose, e.g., to
reduce the trust of an e-commerce competitor platform.
Recent advances in the study of the security ofMLmodels, named
adversarial machine learning (AML) [25], have revealed the vulner-
ability of state-of-the-art ML models for tasks across variety of
domains, such as computer vision (CV) [3], natural language pro-
cessing (NLP) [41], and more recently RS [13]. Adversarial attacks
against ML models were formalized for the first time in the pio-
neering work by Szegedy et al. [34] in which the authors evaluated
the vulnerability of state-of-the-art deep neural networks for image
classification against adversarial perturbation of the input image
data (pixel values). They found that a modest perturbation level
is sufficient to confuse the system to classify a given instance of
pandas image into the wrong gibbon class with high confidence,
whereby human judgment is unaffected. Adversarial perturbations
are generated by a model, named the adversarial attack model,
whose goal is to add a norm-constrained amount of perturbation
on the data (𝑥 = 𝑥 + Δ where ∥Δ∥ < 𝜖), to enforce the ML model
to make a wrong prediction (e.g., misclassification). Adversarial de-
fense is the design of mechanisms that can withstand and mitigate
the impact of adversarial attacks — i.e., they aim to enhance the
robustness against adversarial threats.
In the field of CV, several adversarial attack strategies have been
proposed such as FGSM [18], BIM [27], PGD [29], and Carlini and
Wagner [9] as well as defense mechanisms such as adversarial
training [18] and knowledge distillation [24, 30]. Novel powerful
attack methods are followed by the defensive side of this war, in
which stronger defense strategies are proposed to confront these
attacks and to reduce their impact.
However, attack and defense strategies are treated differently in
the CV and RS communities due to intrinsic differences between
images and RS data. For instance, image data (pixel intensities) is
continuous-valued but RSs data is discrete in nature such as rating
scores or binary-valued interactions (either 0 or 1). For this reason,
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the mainline RS research injects additive adversarial perturbations
on model parameters (e.g., embedding matrix of an LFM), instead
of raw pixel intensities as in for images, and evaluates the variation
of recommendation performance caused by a small and optimized
adversarial noise
The pioneering work of AML for the item recommendation task
has been presented by He et al. in [21]. The authors compared the
impact of adversarial perturbation generated randomly and via
an adversarial model against Bayesian Pairwise Ranking matrix fac-
torization (BPR-MF) [31], the state-of-the-art pairwise recommen-
dation model. They discovered that the adversarial noise obtained
from a single-step adversarial perturbation model [18] leads to a sig-
nificant deterioration of test accuracy, which is 5 times larger than
the one caused by random variation, i.e., -10% v.s. -55% reduction of
𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺@100 for a given fixed perturbation budget (𝜖 = 1). These re-
sults raise the question: “how much state-of-the-art machine-learned
models are robust against small adversarial perturbations?”. Note
that the application scenario of these adversarial perturbations is
not related to an adversary that enters in an RS and changes the
parameters of the model. In fact, as proposed by He et al. [21], it
aims to study the weaknesses when training a recommender model
that might learn parameters such that a small variation will cause a
drastic performance degradation. For instance, this variation might
be potentially caused by the update of model parameters when new
users, or products, are added into the system.
Furthermore, He et al. [21] demonstrated that by applying an
adversarial training procedure [18], named adversarial personal-
ized ranking (APR), the RS performs more robustly against ad-
versarial perturbations generated by the single-step method and
might improve the model generalizability with a consequent im-
provement in accuracy [21, 21, 40]. However, it is not studied how
brittle AMF — i.e., the APR-robustified version of BPR-MF— and
BPR-MF are against perturbations generated by other adversarial
strategies. In fact, despite the popularity of AML for security in
ML/CV and recently in RS communities, we have noted that there
exists a pronounced imbalance in the distribution of research ef-
forts. Among most papers studied in recent years [13], almost all
RS papers specialize in one attack model, namely FGSM [18, 21].
However, in the CV domain, iterative adversarial perturbations have
been demonstrated to improve the attack effectiveness by more
than 60% compared to FGSM [27]. To the best of our knowledge,
no major attempt has been made in the RS community to study the
RS performance variation when model embeddings are altered by
multi-step perturbations.
To fill this gap, in this work, we present two CV-inspired multi-
step adversarial perturbation mechanisms, namely the basic itera-
tive method (BIM) [27] and projected gradient descent (PGD) [29].
We empirically investigate the robustness of the existing defense
strategy in RSs, APR applied on BPR-MF, against the proposed
perturbations. We focus our study on adversarial perturbation on
BPR-MF based models motivated by the fact that the adversarial
perturbation and defense mechanisms proposed by He et al. [21]
have been designed for BPR-MF and then applied in several recom-
mender models (e.g., AMR [35], FGACAE [40], SACRA [28]).
To provide better understanding of the proposal, we run exten-
sive experiments to study the impact of data characteristics such as
data sparsity on attack/defense methods’ performance and evaluate
the performance of the system against beyond-accuracy metrics,
i.e., expected free discovery, Shannon Entropy, and item coverage.
This work aims to answer the following research questions:
• Against the common background in the field of RS, that rec-
ognizes FGSM as the main adversarial perturbation strategy,
and let the perturbation budget be fixed, do the multi-step
adversarial perturbation models, PGD and BIM, outperform
FGSM in degrading the quality of system, with respect to
accuracy and beyond-accuracy evaluation measures?
• Is the state-of-the-art defensive mechanism, adversarial per-
sonalized ranking (APR), still useful against the presented
iteratively generated noise?
• Structural user-item data characteristics have been demon-
strated to influence the effectiveness of shilling attacks [14].
Is this influence confirmed also in the case of 𝜖-bounded
adversarial perturbation of model parameters?
To this end, we evaluated the proposed strategies against two
standardmodel-based collaborative recommenders, i.e., BPR-MF [31]
and its adversarial robustified version AMF [21], on two well-
recognized recommender datasets, i.e., ML-1M and LastFM. Overall,
the considered strategies highlight the necessity to investigate new
robustification methods to make the recommender models more
robust to the performance worsening caused by this minimal noise.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we present background on collaborative recom-
menders and the advances of adversarial machine learning in rec-
ommendation settings.
2.1 Collaborative Recommendation.
Different types of recommendation models have been proposed in
the last thirty years, which can be mainly categorized into collab-
orative filtering (CF), content-based, and hybrid RS [32]. The first
category learns users’ preferences from historical user-item interac-
tions, e.g., User- and Item-kNN [26] and BPR-FM [31]. The second
category suggests unseen products based on the content-based sim-
ilarity of user consumed items and other unseen items [12]. The
last class combines both techniques to augment user-item interac-
tions with side information [8]. Model-based CF models such as
BPR-MF [31] and recent neural models such as neural collaborative
filtering (NCF) [22] are popular choices in the RS and ML commu-
nities. BPR-MF is the major recommendation model used in the RS
community for research on adversarial attacks [13]. In this work,
we chose BPR-MF and AMF [21], that applies an adversarial train-
ing on BPR-MF (see Eq. 8), as the core recommendation methods
tested for all the conducted experiments.
2.2 Adversarial Machine Learning in
Recommender Systems.
Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) approaches in RSs are clas-
sified based on their application on either (i) the security of RS
or, (ii) the learning model of the generative adversarial networks
(GANs) [17] in GAN-based RS [13]. Security (i.e., attack on and
defense of) RS has been studied in two lines of research [13]: based
on hand-engineered shilling attack and, (ii) machine-learned pertur-
bations using AML techniques. The former category is based on the
injection of fake profiles manually generated by malicious users [7].
The latter category, which is the focus of the current work, studied
the application of ML techniques to generate optimal perturbations
to reduce the performance of a recommender model [5, 11, 21] and
their defense countermeasures [15, 21]. Pioneering work by He et
al. [21] reported grave vulnerability of BPR-MF against adversarial
perturbation obtained from the fast gradient signmethod (FGSM) at-
tack model and suggested an adversarial training procedure, named
adversarial regularization as a defensive countermeasure. Inspired
by this work, several other works incorporated adversarial train-
ing procedure in several recommendation tasks and models e.g.,
AMR [35] on fashion recommendation, FG-ACAE [39, 40] for col-
laborative deep recommendation, ATF [10] for tensor factorization
and so forth. However, we found that research in RS community
lacks sufficient relevant studies on another category of adversarial
attacks such as iterative attacks, e.g., BIM [27] and PGD [29], which
have been shown to be effective in tampering computer vision tasks.
This work provides an exhaustive analysis of this gap between the
lack of works using multi-step adversarial perturbation in the RS
domain in order to investigate if the recommendation performance
are muchworse with iterative perturbations than with non-iterative
ones by fixing the size of the adversarial noise.
3 THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In this section, we describe the foundations of a personalized matrix
factorization (MF) recommender model. Then, we recapitulate the
baseline single-step adversarial perturbation before defining the
multi-step strategies.
3.1 Personalized Recommenders via Matrix
Factorization.
The recommendation problem is the task of estimating a preference
prediction function 𝑠 (𝑢, 𝑖) that maximizes the utility of the user
𝑢 ∈ U in getting the item 𝑖 ∈ I recommended by the RS, whereU
and I are the set of users and items respectively. Before we dive
into the description of the matrix factorization model, we introduce
the following notation:
• P: the matrix of user embeddings, where p𝑢 is the embedding
vector associated to the user 𝑢;
• Q: the matrix of item embeddings, where q𝑖 is the embedding
vector associated to the item 𝑖;
• Θ: the set of model parameters (Θ = {P,Q});
• L: the loss function
Themain intuition behind theMFmodel is to compute the prefer-
ence score 𝑠 (𝑢, 𝑖) as the dot product between the user’s embedding
(p𝑢 ) and the item’s embedding (q𝑖 ), i.e., 𝑠 (𝑢, 𝑖) = p𝑇𝑢 p𝑖 . Bayesian Per-
sonalized Ranking (BPR) [31] that uses a pairwise learning-to-rank
method, is the state-of-the-art approach to produce personalized
rankings. BPR is based on the idea of reducing ranking problem
to pairwise classification problem between interacted and non-
interacted products. The model parameters are learned by solving
the optimization problem in the following general form:
argmin
Θ
L(Θ) (1)
To solve the minimization problem in Eq. 1, in our experimental
evaluation, we used the adaptive gradient optimizer (Adagrad).
3.2 Adversarial Perturbation of Model
Parameters.
The main intuition behind an adversarial perturbation method is to
generate minimum perturbations (∆𝑎𝑑𝑣 ) capable of undermining
the learning objective of the learning model. The adversary’s goal
is to maximize Eq. 1, under a minimal-norm constraint:
Δ𝑎𝑑𝑣 ← argmax
∆0, | |∆0 | | ≤𝜖
L(Θ + ∆0) (2)
where ∆0 is the initial adversarial perturbation added to the model
parameters Θ at the beginning of the adversarial perturbation and
𝜖 is the perturbation budget, the limit the amount of perturbation.
Equations 1 and 2 can be represented under unique minimax opti-
mization formulation presented below:
arg min
Θ
max
∆0, | |∆0 | | ≤𝜖
L(Θ + ∆0) (3)
in which two opposite players play an adversarial minimax game,
where the adversary tries to maximize the likelihood of its success
while the ML model tries to minimize the risk. This minimax game
is the main characteristic of tasks related to AML research [13, 38].
3.2.1 Single-Step Adversarial Perturbation (FGSM). [21]. This per-
turbation strategy is the baseline single-step adversarial noise mech-
anism to alter item recommendation results and was first proposed
by He et al. in [21]. It builds on advanced made in ML research
pioneered by Goodfellow et al. [18] for the classification task. It
approximates L by linearizing it around an initial zero-matrix per-
turbation ∆0 and applies the max-norm constraint. The adversarial
perturbation ∆𝑎𝑑𝑣 is defined as:
∆𝑎𝑑𝑣 = 𝜖
Π
∥Π∥ where Π =
𝜕L(Θ + ∆0)
𝜕∆0
(4)
where | | · | | is the 𝐿2−norm. After the calculation of ∆𝑎𝑑𝑣 , Goodfel-
low et al. added this perturbation to the current model parameters
Θ𝑎𝑑𝑣 = Θ + ∆𝑎𝑑𝑣 and generated the recommendation lists with
this perturbed model parameter. He et al. in [21] demonstrated that
perturbation obtained from the FGSM with 𝜖 = 0.5 can impair the
accuracy of item recommendation by an amount equal to −26.3%.
3.2.2 Multi-Step Adversarial Perturbation. This adversarial noise
generation mechanism is a straightforward extension of the single-
step strategy and was proposed by Kurakin et al. [27]. In particular,
the authors’ idea was to build an FGSM-based multi-step strategy
and creating more effective 𝜖-clipped perturbations. The initial
model parameters are defined as
Θ𝑎𝑑𝑣0 = Θ + ∆0 (5)
Starting from this initial state of model parameters, let 𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑝Θ,𝜖
be an element-wise clipping function to limit the perturbation of
each original embedding value inside the [−𝜖, +𝜖] interval, let 𝛼 be
the step size which is the maximum perturbation budget of each
iteration, and let 𝐿 be the number of iterations, the first iteration
(𝑙 = 1) is defined by:
Θ𝑎𝑑𝑣1 = 𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑝Θ,𝜖
{
Θ𝑎𝑑𝑣0 + 𝛼
Π
∥Π∥
}
where Π = 𝜕L(Θ + ∆0)
𝜕∆0
(6)
and we generalize the 𝑙-th iteration of the 𝐿-iterations multi-step
adversarial perturbation as:
Θ𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑙 = 𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑝Θ,𝜖
{
Θ𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑙−1 + 𝛼
Π
∥Π∥
}
where Π =
𝜕L(Θ + ∆𝑎𝑑𝑣
𝑙−1 )
𝜕∆𝑎𝑑𝑣
𝑙−1
(7)
where 𝑙 ∈ [1, 2, ..., 𝐿],∆𝑎𝑑𝑣
𝑙
is the adversarial perturbation at the 𝑙-th
iteration, and Θ𝑎𝑑𝑣
𝑙
is the sum of the original model parameters Θ
with the perturbation at the 𝑙-th iteration. Inspired by the advances
of AML in iterative adversarial perturbations, we considered two
different versions of multi-step optimized adversarial perturbation:
the Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [27] and the Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD) [29] approaches. The former approach initializes ∆0
of Eq. 5 as zeros matrices with the same size of the matrix embed-
dings of the victim model (the model under perturbation), i.e., P and
Q. The latter is the BIM extension that sets the initial perturbation
by sampling it from a uniform distribution. This difference in the
initialization of ∆0 makes PGD more powerful than BIM in confus-
ing CV image classifiers [4]. We chose both strategies to investigate
whether such a difference between two adversarial perturbation
strategies exists for the recommendation task.
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we introduce the two explored datasets, the model-
based RSs, and the set of evaluation measures. Then, we detail the
experimental choices to make the results reproducible.
4.1 Datasets
To experiment with our proposed iterative perturbations, we con-
ducted experiments on two public datasets:
Movielens 1M (ML-1M) [20] contains users’ explicit feedbacks
(i.e., ratings) towards a catalog of movies given in the [1, 5]-scale.
We took the public version within the set of users’ additional at-
tributes (e.g., user’s gender, age, and occupation) andmovies’ genres.
The dataset has 6,040 users (|U|), 3,706 items (|I |), and 1,000,209
recorded feedbacks (|F |).
LastFM-1b (LastFM) [33] containsmore than one billion recorded
interactions (e.g., the user’s actions of listening tracks) stored from
the online music provider Last.fm from January 2013 to August
2014. We used the pre-processed version proposed in [14], extract-
ing a sampled version with several recorded feedbacks comparable
to the ML-1M ones (i.e., about 1 million). The experimented dataset
has 2,847 users (|U|), 33,164 items (|I |), and 935,875 historical pref-
erences (|F |).
For both the datasets, we transformed all the recorded interac-
tions into 1-valued implicit feedback following the dataset experi-
mental setting proposed in [21].
4.2 Recommender Models
We verified the impact of the proposed iterative adversarial pertur-
bations against two baseline recommender models: BPR-MF [31]
and AMF [21]. In particular, the second model has been specifi-
cally proposed to make BPR-MF more robust under the single-step
adversarial perturbation (FGSM).
BPR-MF [31] is a matrix factorization recommender optimized
with a pair-wise loss function (i.e., BPR). The fundamental intuition
of BPR-MF is to discard not-interacted items with respect to inter-
acted ones in order to learn a rank-based preference predictor. We
denote with L𝐵𝑃𝑅 (Θ) = L(Θ) the BPR-MF loss function.
AMF [21] is the extension of BPR-MF which includes an adver-
sarial training procedure. The main idea is to extend the BPR-MF
loss function within a classical adversarial mini-max game. In fact,
the authors proposed to include additional training steps to mini-
mize the following loss function:
L𝐴𝑀𝐹 (Θ) = L𝐵𝑃𝑅 (Θ) + 𝜆 L𝐵𝑃𝑅 (Θ𝑎𝑑𝑣)︸          ︷︷          ︸
adversarial regularizer
(8)
where the adversarial regularizer component builds the adversarial
perturbation (Θ𝑎𝑑𝑣 ) with the FGSM approach described in Eq. 4.
This model has been demonstrated to reduce up to 88% the impact
of single-step perturbations on the recommendation accuracy [21].
4.3 Evaluation Metrics
We conducted a three-level analysis to answer the research ques-
tions defined in Section 1. In the first level we focused on assessing
the efficacy of our proposed iterative perturbations under the lens
of the destruction of the recommendation accuracy. To handle
this objective we studied precision (𝑃𝑅@𝐾), recall (𝑅𝐸@𝐾), and
normalized discounted cumulative gain (𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾) evaluated on
per-users’ top-𝐾 recommendation lists [19]. 𝑃𝑅@𝐾 measures the
fraction of suggested items relevant to the users concerning the
length of the recommendations (𝐾), 𝑅𝐸@𝐾 evaluates the average
fraction of user’s relevant recommended items in the top-𝐾 over the
number of items in her test set, and 𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾 computes the users’
utility (gain) given the ranked list by discounting the correctly
predicted relevant items by their positions.
Furthermore, we explored the effect of iterative perturbations
with respect to beyond accuracy metrics. In particular, we analyzed
three metrics: novelty by computing the capacity to suggest relevant
long-tail products using the expected free discovery (𝐸𝐹𝐷@𝐾 ) [37],
the diversity in the recommendation lists using the Shannon En-
tropy (𝑆𝐸@𝐾 ) [36], and the item coverage (𝐼𝐶𝑜𝑣@𝐾 ) as the number
of recommended products across all the top-𝐾 users’ recommenda-
tion lists [16].
4.4 Reproducibility
In this section, we provide reproducibility details.
Evaluation Protocol. The evaluation protocol employed to ver-
ify the proposed iterative adversarial perturbations is the leave-one-
out protocol [21, 31], putting in the test set either the last historical
interaction — when that information is available (i.e., ML-1M)– or a
random interaction (i.e., LastFM), and using the rest of the recorded
feedbacks to train the recommenders. Furthermore, we evaluated
the generated top-10 recommendation lists to get results closer to
a real-world exposure of recommendations to customers, filtering
out the already interacted products for each user’s list.
Recommender Models.We followed the training scheme pro-
posed in [21]. We trained the defense-free recommender model,
BPR-MF, for 2,000 epochs with themodel embedding size fixed to 64,
the learning rate values to 0.05, without regularization coefficients.
Furthermore, we stored the model parameters at the 1,000 epoch to
be the starting point for the adversarial regularized version of BPR-
MF, i.e., AMF (see Section 4.2). We set the adversarial regularization
coefficient (𝜆) to 1 as suggested by He et al. [21]. Starting from
the restored BPR-MF model, we trained AMF for additional 1,000
epochs. We optimized both the recommenders using the mini-batch
adaptive gradient optimizer (Adagrad) with a batch size fixed to 512.
Moreover, we have compared the performance of the adversarially
perturbed model-based recommender with the performance of the
random recommender.
Adversarial perturbations. For the baseline FGSM perturba-
tion, we fixed the budget perturbation 𝜖 to 0.5, which is the smallest
perturbation experimented in [21]. Then, we implemented BIM and
PGD setting the step size 𝛼 to 𝜖/4 and varying the budget perturba-
tion (𝜖) and the number of iterations (𝐿) depending on the research
question under investigation.
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the experimental results to answer the
previously defined open questions on the effectiveness of iterative
perturbations1 and the impact of structural dataset characteristics
on the robustness of the model under perturbations.
5.1 Investigating the effect of iterative
perturbations against the recommender
performance accuracy.
This study aims to measure the effects of adversarial perturbations
on accuracy and beyond-accuracy objectives. In particular, to better
understand the merits of the presented adversarial perturbations,
we aim to answer the following evaluation questions:
• On the perturbation side: how much adversarial pertur-
bations obtained from the single-step FGSM and the two
iterative BIM and PGD perturbation methods can impair the
quality of the original BPR-MF model? The answer to this
question can be found in Fig. 1a & Fig. 1c by comparing the
original non-perturbed model with the rest.
• On the defensive side: what is the impact of adversarial
training on BPR-MF using the state-of-the-art AMF recom-
mender model on the previous question? The answer to this
question can be found in Fig. 1b & Fig. 1d.
In this line, since the performance of the two presented multi-
step adversarial perturbations varies based on the number of iter-
ations, in Section 5.1.1 we discuss and analyze the effectiveness
of the presented perturbations across different iterations. After-
ward, in Section 5.1.2, we relax the iteration dimension, and for
a fixed iteration number, we study how adversarial perturbation
budget 𝜖 impairs recommendation outcomes of two categories of
perturbations (iterative v.s. single-step FGSM).
5.1.1 Impact of iterative perturbations based on number of iterations.
Fig. 1 visualizes the performance (accuracy and beyond-accuracy)
variations by increasing the number of iterations for the LastFM
dataset. We use the plot visualization only for the LastFM dataset
to show the obtained insights vividly. We show the performance of
random recommender to serve as a lower baseline. Then, Table 1
1Throughout this work, the terms iterative perturbations and multi-step perturbations
are used in an interchangeable manner.
summarizes the complete results obtained across various evalua-
tion metrics and recommendation/perturbation models on both the
ML-1M and LastFM datasets. For space limitation, Table 1 reports
the normalized accumulated values of the measured recommenda-
tion performance across iterations due to the large set of examined
metrics.
On the perturbation side, by looking at Fig 1a, one can note that
both multi-step perturbations, i.e., BIM and PGD, are more powerful
compared with the state-of-the-art single-step FGSM perturbation,
for a fixed perturbation budget 𝜖 = 0.5. We can realize that only
after 25 iterations, the 𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺 of PGD drops from the original 0.2033
to 0.0080, which is much lower than FGSM (0.1216). For instance,
the PGD perturbation shows 15.1 (0.1216 v.s. 0.0080), 20.4 (0.1216
v.s. 0.0060), and 23.8 (0.1216 v.s. 0.0051) times stronger impact with
respect to FGSM, for iterations 25, 40, and 50 respectively. These
results confirm the findings in the CV field [27] on the superior-
ity of iterative adversarial strategies — in terms of perturbations’
effectiveness — compared to single-step ones for the item recom-
mendation task. They also demonstrate the vulnerability of the
state-of-the-art pairwise ranking model (BPR-MF) against modern
adversarial perturbations. To show the impact better, we can com-
pare the quality of BPR-MF with the random recommender in Fig 1a
in which we can realize after about 25 iterations, the perturbed BPR-
MF starts to perform similar to the random recommender. In other
words, after few iterations under iterative perturbations, the BPR-
MF model loses all the learned information about the individual
users’ preferences.
The same pattern of results can be noticed by looking at the
overall results provided in Table 1, where for all <dataset, recom-
mender> combinations, the iterative perturbation strategies (PGD
and BIM) outperform FGSM. For instance, the <ML-1M, BPR-MF>
combination shows that the accuracy performance under the PGD
perturbation is reduced by more than 2 times compared to FGSM,
e.g., (0.0074 v.s. 0.0035), (0.0740 v.s. 0.0353), and (0.0368 v.s. 0.0172)
for 𝑃𝑅, 𝑅𝐸, and 𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺 , respectively. Here, we should point out that
both Figure 1 and Table 1 do not show a clear difference/advantages
of PGD perturbation compared to BIM perturbation. This finding
is different from the one previously reported by Athalye et al. [4]
in CV. We motivate it by the fact that the item recommendation
model BPR is less sensitive to the initial value of weights compared
with a classification task by using a deep neural network, since in
BPR the gradients are computed based on the differences between
pairs.
For what concerns beyond-accuracy analysis, we found an in-
teresting behavior for the defense-free BPR-MF. We can see that
during the first 25 iterations of BIM, 𝐼𝐶𝑜𝑣 increments nearly by
76% (from 6,220 to 10,928) compared to the coverage value of the
non-perturbed recommender (see Fig. 1c). After that, it steadily
diminishes with a minimum 𝐼𝐶𝑜𝑣 value of 1,948 (for BIM). This
result may be justified by the fact that when the multi-step per-
turbation has computed several iterations (𝐿 ≥ 70), it steadily
destructs the accuracy metrics, and brings the model to recom-
mend a set of few items that all the users will not appreciate. Thus,
we can note that the proposed iterative perturbations impair the
personalized recommender to perform as bad as a random recom-
mender (see Fig. 1a) concerning accuracy metric and even worse
with respect to beyond-accuracy metrics. Table 1 confirms low
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(a) Defense-free BPR-MF model.
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(b) Defended BPR-MF model - AMF.
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(c) Defense-free BPR-MF model.
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(d) Defended BPR-MF model - AMF.
Random BPR-MF AMF FGSM ( = 0.5) BIM ( = 0.5) PGD ( = 0.5)
Figure 1: Results of accuracy (𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺) and diversity (𝐼𝐶𝑜𝑣) metrics for the LastFM dataset. Figures (a) and (b) show the effects of
adversarial perturbations on the 𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺 on BPR-MF and AMF respectively. Figures (c) and (d) report the variation of the 𝐼𝐶𝑜𝑣 .
Figures report also the results of the random recommender (violet dotted line).
Table 1: Comparison of Initial not-perturbed performance and single-step FGSM with the accumulated normalized values of
the accuracy and beyond-accuracy metrics across the multi-step adversarial perturbation strategies (see Figure 1) evaluated
on the top-10 recommendation lists. The perturbation budget 𝜖 is 0.5. We put in bold the lower value (the perturbation is more
effective).
Model Metric@10
LastFM ML-1M
Initial FGSM BIM PGD Initial FGSM BIM PGD
BPR-MF
𝑃𝑅 0.0310 0.0211 0.0019 0.0018 0.0088 0.0074 0.0035 0.0035
𝑅𝐸 0.3102 0.2115 0.0194 0.0177 0.0884 0.0740 0.0353 0.0353
𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺 0.2033 0.1216 0.0111 0.0100 0.0447 0.0368 0.0174 0.0172
𝐸𝐹𝐷 0.5144 0.3069 0.0313 0.0284 0.0977 0.0791 0.0355 0.0353
𝑆𝐸 11.3454 11.1359 10.1703 10.2141 9.6306 9.1582 7.4000 7.4457
𝐼𝐶𝑜𝑣 6220 5645 4352 4428 2247 2433 1189 1213
AMF
𝑃𝑅 0.0357 0.0316 0.0164 0.0167 0.0092 0.0085 0.0048 0.0048
𝑅𝐸 0.3565 0.3165 0.1644 0.1667 0.0922 0.0846 0.0482 0.0484
𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺 0.2421 0.2147 0.1010 0.1030 0.0462 0.0419 0.0228 0.0231
𝐸𝐹𝐷 0.5987 0.5184 0.2303 0.2352 0.0971 0.0853 0.0442 0.0447
𝑆𝐸 9.9758 8.8980 7.1871 7.1993 8.3049 7.4123 6.2958 6.2984
𝐼𝐶𝑜𝑣 3847 2708 2315 2321 1486 1169 1066 1077
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Figure 2: Results on iterative perturbations with a fixed number
of iterations 𝐿 = 25 and increasing budget perturbation values 𝜖 ∈
[0.001, 10.0] on LastFM dataset. Figure 2a and 2b shows that with a
small perturbation e.g., 𝜖 ≃ 0.1, multi-step noises are more effective
than a single-step ones with a bigger perturbation budget (𝜖 = 0.5).
beyond-accuracy metric values (𝐸𝐹𝐷 and the 𝑆𝐸) for BIM and PGD
perturbations, with reduction factor equal to or more than 50% and
20% respectively, independently from the <dataset, recommender,
iterative-perturbation> combination.
On the defensive side, we studied the impact of adversarial train-
ing, known as APR, on various perturbation strategies. We observed
an evident performance drop in accuracy for AMF (see Figure 1b),
which is, on average, more than 58% for multi-step strategies and
11.31% for the single-step one (see Table 1). For instance, the PGD
perturbation shows 1.48 (0.2147 v.s. 0.1448), 1.86 (0.2147 v.s. 0.1154),
and 1.94 (0.2147 v.s. 0.1106) times stronger impact with respect to
FGSM, for iterations 20, 30, and 50 respectively. However, the accu-
racy reduction does not reach random performance as for the BPR-
MF recommender. We may explain this slight decrease/increase in
robustness by mentioning the partial effectiveness of the adversar-
ial regularization procedure (i.e., specifically designed to protect
against single-step perturbations [21]).
5.1.2 Impact of iterative perturbations based on 𝜖-limited budget
perturbation.
In this study, we relax the investigation of the impact of itera-
tion increase on iterative perturbations’ performances. Instead, by
fixing the number of iterations (i.e., 𝐿 = 25, the value previously
shown to be the critical point (the elbow of the curve in Fig. 1a)
in performance deterioration) and varying 𝜖 from 0.001 to 10, we
investigate at what 𝜖-level, iterative perturbations can get a similar
performance comparable with FGSM. Analyzing Fig. 2a & 2b, we
found that iterative adversarial strategies reach the FGSM (𝜖 = 0.5)
performance at iteration-level 𝜖 ≃ 0.1. In other words, by using
0.5/0.1 =5 times less perturbation budget, the new iterative strategies
reach a similar performance as that of the state-of-the-art FGSM
perturbation strategy, independently from the recommender, i.e.,
the defense-free BPR-MF or the adversarial defensed AMF.
In summary, the results of two above studies provides strong
evidence that:
• iterative perturbations for the item recommendation task
aremore powerful than the single-step strategies widely adopted
in the prior literature of RS community. For example, let the
perturbation budget fixed to 𝜖 = 0.5, the multi-step strategies
reduce the BPR-MF performance by an amount of 15 times
(along 𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺) with only 25 iterations, while, let the caused per-
formance degradation fixed, iterative strategies are as effective
as single-step ones by using only the 20% of the perturbation
budget (𝜖 ≃ 0.1);
• the state-of-the-art robustification strategy adopted in the
RS community, the adversarial regularization, can diminish
the impact of iterative perturbations. However, the iterative
perturbations still have a high capability to impact and impair
the quality of the defended recommender. These results suggest
the need to identify mediating factors that can reduce the
impact of iterative perturbations against RS, but it is left for
future investigation.
5.2 Studying the impact of structural dataset
characteristics.
The second part of our analysis relates to the effect of structural
dataset characteristics on adversarial perturbations’ effectiveness.
Inspired by the exploratory study on the impact of dataset character-
istics on the accuracy [1] and shilling perturbations robustness [14]
of RSs, we evaluated the effect of the density, size, and shape struc-
tural features in the variation of an accuracy metric (𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺) un-
der adversarial perturbation on the model parameters, defined by
|F |/|U |×|I |, |U| × |I|, and |U |/|I | respectively. We produced 10
sub-samples for each dataset with different structural properties.
Each sub-sample is a k-core version of the original datasets, such
that we removed users and items with less than k recorded inter-
actions. Note that increasing the k from 10 to 100, enabled us to
generate sub-samples with increasing levels of density.
Figure 3 shows the relative percentage variation of the accu-
racy metric with respect to the reference 𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 (performance
before the perturbation), defined by 𝜌 = Δ𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 × 100 where
Δ𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺 = 𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 −𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑎𝑓 𝑡𝑒𝑟 represents the change on 𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺
before and after the adversarial perturbation. In line with what has
been shown in [14] on the impact of dataset characteristics on the
effectiveness of hand-engineered shilling perturbations against CF
models, our results as well confirm the relationship between the den-
sity of the dataset and adversarial perturbations’ effectiveness. This
means, increasing density of the dataset tends to reduce the impact
of perturbation measured by 𝜌 . For instance, the PGD perturbation
against <ML-1M, BPR-MF> combination with sub-samples having
densities equal to 0.0507 and 0.1387, caused a performance reduction
of 43.79%, and 28.90%. Thus, we can observe that denser (i.e., less
sparse) datasets protect recommender models against adversarial
perturbations. This can be explained by the fact that increasing den-
sity inherently increases inter-dependency among users and items
and can improve robustness, as also mentioned by Christakopoulou
et al. [11].
For what concerns investigation on the impact of size and the
shape characteristics, we report in Figures. 3b to 3f, the values
obtained for 𝜌 by increasing the size and shape of the datasets
(sub-samples). We found that these characteristics show similar
behavior, i.e., increasing shape/size implies increments 𝜌 (impact
of perturbations), and these results are consistent with findings for
shilling perturbation analysis in [14].
Finally, we examined the impact of defense strategy on the pre-
vious insights about the effect of data characteristics. Fig. 3a & 3d
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Figure 3: Results of applying the single-step and multi-step iterative adversarial perturbation against BPR-MF (first-row) and AMF (second-
row) models trained on different sub-samples of ML-1M dataset. The 𝜌 measures the relative percentage variation of the 𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺 before and after
perturbations. Decreasing trends indicates that increasing in the dataset characteristic values (e.g.,density), the perturbation is less effective.
We plot the fitted lines (using least-square cost) to facilitate compassion between models.
show that the influence of density on 𝜌 is much higher in BPR-MF
than in AMF. For example, the slope2 of the PGD fitted line evalu-
ated is -96.10 and -3.65 for BPR-MF and AMF respectively (note that
scales in the y-axis for plots shown for Fig. 3a and 3d are different).
The same pattern is visible for the shape and size properties. We can
conclude that dataset characteristics do not influence the efficacy
of adversarial perturbations against adversarial defended models
as much as in the defense-free setting.
We can summarize the findings as follows: structural dataset char-
acteristics, i.e., shape, space, and density, impact the effectiveness of
adversarial perturbations against model-based CF recommenders such
that adversarial perturbations are less effective by either increasing
the density or decreasing the shape/size of the dataset. Furthermore,
the analysis on the impact of dataset characteristics confirms that
APR, applied on AMF, reduces the effectiveness of both single and
multi-step adversarial perturbations.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We proposed iterative adversarial perturbations on the model em-
bedding of matrix factorization-based recommender models. We
studied the impact of the proposed perturbations with extensive
2Slope has been calculated using the formula𝑚 = 𝑦2−𝑦1𝑥2−𝑥1 where (𝑥1, 𝑦1) and (𝑥2, 𝑦2)
represent two points in the line.
experiments on two datasets (i.e., LastFM and ML-1M) and two state-
of-the-art MF recommenders, i.e., BPR-MF, and AMF— an extension
of BPR-MF that integrates the adversarial training as the defense
against single-step perturbations. Our experiments show that under
a fixed perturbation budget, the presented multi-step perturbation
strategies, namely the basic iterative method (BIM), and projected
gradient descent (PGD), are considerably more effective than the
state-of-the-art single-step FGSM method. We verified the degrada-
tion of recommendation quality along with accuracy and beyond-
accuracy metrics. In particular, experiment validations showed that:
(i) non-defended recommenders perturbed by the multi-step pertur-
bation strategies can be impaired/weakened so much so that their
performance becomes worse than a random recommender and, (ii)
even the adversarially defended model against FGSM can lose half
of its recommendation performance, — i.e., after being confronted
with an iterative perturbation, they preserve only half of the learned
personalized users’ preferences. Equivalently, we verified that iter-
ative perturbations could produce the same performance drop as of
FGSM perturbations with 5-time smaller perturbation levels. These
results evidence the vulnerability of the personalized BPR-learned
models, both in defended and non-defended scenarios.
Then, we investigated the impact of structural dataset charac-
teristics (i.e., density, size, and shape) on the efficacy of adversarial
perturbations and verified that recommenders trained on denser
datasets are more robust to adversarial perturbations while increas-
ing the shape, or the size, the model becomes more vulnerable.
The challenges that we plan to investigate in the future are on the
study of defense strategies to robustify the recommender against
the iterative perturbations in order to make RS robust to slight
variations of model parameters. Moreover, we intend to investigate
the fairness of the recommendations, by exploring users and items
clusters (for instance, created based on their attributes or according
to their popularity) and investigate methods to find the impact on
fairness metrics based on the perturbations of the recommender
parameters.
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